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AT&T M OBILITY AND FAA O VER -P REEMPTION
Jill Gross*
It is no secret that pre-dispute arbitration clauses in adhesive consumer and employment
agreements have been harshly criticized in this country in recent years. Critics label these
clauses, which often contain one-sided provisions, such as class arbitration waivers and
inconvenient venue and cost-shifting provisions, as oppressive and unfair to those with inferior
bargaining power.1
The Supreme Court’s most recent decisions under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)2
have only exacerbated this ongoing debate. These rulings have stripped the arbitrators of the
power to construe silence in an arbitration agreement as consent to class arbitration,3 reaffirmed
the arbitrability of federal statutory claims,4 upheld a clause in an arbitration agreement
delegating to arbitrators the power to rule on the unconscionability of the arbitration clause,5 and
enforced a class arbitration waiver in an arbitration agreement.6 Among other impacts, these
decisions have effectively foreclosed the ability of consumers and employees to pursue low-dollar
value claims, as they can no longer consolidate them in an arbitration proceeding.7
These decisions clearly reflect the Court’s strong support of arbitration agreements. That
strong support does not come without a cost, however, as these decisions also severely limit the
states’ powers to police the fairness of arbitration agreements. In particular, the Court’s decision
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion8 expands the FAA preemption doctrine beyond its prior
boundaries, signaling how far the Court is willing to go to support arbitration clauses at the
expense of states’ rights and the values of federalism. This article will explore the impact of
AT&T Mobility on the preemption of state law and the concomitant impact on the balance
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between state and federal power in the arbitration arena. This article argues that AT&T Mobility
results in FAA over-preemption,9 as it unduly shifts arbitration law-making power away from the
states, in violation of the FAA’s savings clause.

I.

T H E FAA P R E E M P T I O N D O C T R I N E

Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 “to overrule the judiciary’s long-standing refusal to
enforce agreements to arbitrate.”10 Animated by the overarching principle of contractual
autonomy, the FAA’s primary purpose was to “require[] courts to enforce privately negotiated
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.”11
The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to embody a strong national policy favoring
arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.12 In the past twenty-five years, the
Court’s FAA jurisprudence has imbued the FAA with super-status: it governs virtually every
arbitration clause arising out of a commercial transaction,13 and its substantive provisions apply in
both state and federal court.14 Although it is well-settled that the FAA does not create federal
subject matter jurisdiction,15 the Court has declared repeatedly that the FAA “creates a body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the
coverage of the Act.”16
Another consistent holding in the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence is that its primary
substantive provision, § 2, which declares that agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract”17 preempting state laws that place an arbitration agreement on unequal footing from
other contracts.18 Under the FAA preemption doctrine, § 2 preempts in federal and state court
any state law that “actually conflicts with federal law, that is, to the extent that it ‘stands as an

9

I have previously argued that state courts over-preempt their own laws providing grounds to vacate arbitration
awards. See Jill I. Gross, Over-Preemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004).
10
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
11
Volt, 489 U.S. at 478.
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Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (recognizing a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements”).
13
By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate involving “transactions involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2010). The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase very broadly to include any transaction that in fact involves
interstate commerce, even if the parties did not anticipate an interstate impact. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539
U.S. 52 (2003) (applying FAA to debt restructuring agreements as “involving commerce”); Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (applying FAA to securities arbitrations); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995) (interpreting the reach of the FAA broadly to all transactions “involving commerce”
and stating that “‘involving’ is broad and is indeed the functional equivalent of ‘affecting’”).
14
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (“The statements of the Court in Prima Paint that the
Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act
were to apply in state as well as federal courts.”).
15
See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009); Hall Street Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,
581-82 (2008); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.
16
See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. The Court defined arbitrability in this context as “the
duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.” Id. at 25 n.32.
17
9 U.S.C. § 2. This latter phrase of § 2 is known as the FAA’s “savings clause.”
18
See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
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obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”19
Thus, FAA preemption is a sub-species of “conflict preemption” known as “obstacle
preemption.”20
The FAA’s substantive provision, § 2, reflects a classic federalism balance. On the one
hand, it displaces conflicting state law. Through FAA obstacle preemption, the Supreme Court
has rebuffed state law-based defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements to the extent
those defenses single out arbitration agreements for hostile treatment.21 Thus, the Court has held
that the FAA preempts state statutes that prohibit the arbitration of a particular type of claim,22
state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements on grounds different than those that invalidate
other contracts,23 and state judicial rules that display vestiges of the ancient judicial hostility to
arbitration.24 In these situations, lower courts have had no choice but to declare arbitration
agreements enforceable under federal law even if they might be deemed unenforceable under
state law.25
On the other side of the federalism balance, the savings clause of § 2 preserves for the
states the ability to declare arbitration agreements invalid on grounds traditionally reserved for
state law: common law contract defenses to the enforceability of any contract. Thus, courts
(either state courts or federal courts applying state contract law) have struck down arbitration

19
See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 1; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (preempting California
statute requiring wage collection actions to be resolved in court).
20
The Supreme Court has explained that it will find a state law preempted by a Congressional Act when: (1) the
federal law expressly provides it displaces state law (“express preemption”); (2) Congress intends the federal law in an
area to “occupy the field” (“field preemption”); (3) it is impossible for a party to comply with both the state and federal
law (“impossibility preemption”); and (4) the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (“obstacle preemption”). See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Impossibility and obstacle
preemption are both subcategories of conflict preemption. Id.; see generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV.
225, 228 (2000) (describing preemption categories).
21
None of these decisions preempt a state arbitration law—laws that primarily address arbitration procedures
and award enforcement, and almost uniformly further a pro-arbitration policy. Rather, the Court has preempted state
laws on non-arbitration matters that contain “lingering anti-arbitration sentiment.” Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R.
Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 195 (2002).
22
See Preston, 552 U.S. 346, 356-57 (preempting California law granting exclusive jurisdiction to Labor
Commissioner to decide disputes arising under the Talent Agencies Act); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 8
(1984) (preempting provision of the California Franchise Investment Law that required judicial, not arbitral, resolution
of claims brought under the statute).
23
See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996) (preempting Montana statute requiring
specific type of notice in contract containing arbitration clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
292-93 (1995) (preempting Alabama statute invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts).
24
See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (preempting West Virginia Supreme Court
rule voiding as against public policy pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts with respect to
negligence claims); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (preempting Florida judicial rule
that precluded arbitrators from deciding the legality of a an allegedly usurious contract containing an arbitration
agreement); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (preempting New York law precluding
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages). In contrast, the FAA does not preempt a state arbitration statute that
merely dictates the order of proceedings with respect to an arbitration and related third-party litigation, but does not
regulate the viability or scope of the arbitration agreement itself. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 471.
25
Exhibit A to this article charts all of the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption decisions and describes the state
law at issue, the Court’s preemption holding, and the outcome of the case.
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agreements on contract law grounds such as lack of mutual assent,26 unconscionability,27 an
illusory agreement,28 or violating the contract’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.29
As long as the ground for revocation of the arbitration clause is a ground applicable to all
contracts, and not just arbitration agreements, the states are free to apply their law, free of FAA
preemption. But what happens where courts apply a generally applicable contract defense, such
as unconscionability, in a manner that arguably de facto disfavors arbitration?

II.

T H E AT&T M O B I L IT Y D E C I S I O N

The Court faced such a question in its 2010-11 term. In AT&T Mobility, LLC v.
Concepcion,30 the Court held for the seventh time that the FAA preempted a state law, this time a
state law that on its face was not anti-arbitration but was being applied by lower courts in a
manner that de facto disfavored arbitration. The decision, while noteworthy for its condemnation
of class arbitration, confirms the Court’s intent to severely circumscribe the ability of state law to
regulate the fairness of arbitration, and to that extent is consistent with its previous FAA
jurisprudence.
In AT&T Mobility, the Court ruled that the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank
rule, which “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as
unconscionable.”31 In its consumer cellular phone service contracts, AT&T Mobility, LLC
(“AT&T”) included a pre-dispute arbitration agreement which, inter alia, prohibited plaintiffs
from bringing class action arbitrations, instead requiring claims to be arbitrated on an individual
basis. In 2006, the Concepcions sued AT&T in district court, alleging that AT&T’s practice of
charging sales tax on a phone advertised as “free” was fraudulent.32 In December 2006, after the
Concepcions filed their claim, AT&T revised the arbitration agreement to provide that AT&T
would pay a customer $7,500 if an arbitrator found in favor of a California customer on the merits
of a customer dispute, and awarded more than the last AT&T settlement offer.33 Two years later,
after the Concepcions’ case was consolidated with a putative class action alleging, inter alia,
identical claims of false advertising and fraud, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the
revised agreement.34
The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement under the savings clause of
FAA § 2. The court concluded that the class action waiver of the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable because it had a deterrent effect on class actions and the efficient resolution of
third party claims.35 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, on an interlocutory appeal, the district
26

See, e.g., Phillips v. Mazyck, 643 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 2007); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont.

2002).
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See, e.g., State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 2011); Rivera
v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803 (N.M. 2011).
28
See, e.g., Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Indiana law).
29
See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying Restatement of
Contracts and South Carolina contract law).
30
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
31
Id. at 1746.
32
See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (Concepcion was consolidated with Laster in September 2006).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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court’s conclusion that the class-arbitration waiver was unconscionable and that the FAA did not
preempt the Discover Bank rule,36 AT&T sought review in the Supreme Court.
On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia
(joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), held that the FAA preempts
California’s Discover Bank interpretation of the state’s unconscionability rule. The Court
concluded that the Discover Bank rule created a different law of unconscionability for class action
waivers in adhesive arbitration contracts.37 Thus, the FAA preempts the rule as it singles out
arbitration clauses for suspect treatment.38
The Court rejected the Concepcions’ argument that the Court should defer to the
California Supreme Court’s analysis of its own unconscionability doctrine and instead use an
objective determination on whether or not the rule is “tantamount to a rule of non-enforceability
of arbitration agreements.”39 The majority was persuaded by research which demonstrated that
state courts had become more likely to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable as opposed
to other contracts.40 The Court also noted that although California’s “rule does not require classwide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post,” thus defeating
the purposes of the FAA.41

36

Id. at 853-69.
The Supreme Court noted that, under California law, a court may refuse to enforce a contract that it finds “‘to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made,’” or it may “‘limit the application of any unconscionable clause.’”
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985)) (“A finding of
unconscionability requires a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’
due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.”) (citations omitted). In Discover
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740, the California
Supreme Court applied this unconscionability law to class-action waivers in arbitration agreements and held:
37

[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver
becomes in practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its]
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.” Under these
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and
should not be enforced.
Id. at 1110 (citation omitted).
38

AT&T identified three principles from Discover Bank that it contended courts applied differently to arbitration
agreements than to other contracts: (1) the effect on third parties; (2) the timing of the unconscionability decisions; and
(3) the shock the conscience standard. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09–893).
39
Id. at 39.
40
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
41
Id. at 1750. The Court discussed three characteristics of class arbitration that it concluded defeat the purposes
of the FAA and hinder the flexible party-driven process of arbitration: (1) sacrifice of informality and speed; (2) a
requisite increase in procedural formality; and (3) an increase in risks to defendants in the lack of judicial review. Id. at
1751-52. Although the plurality expressly included the procedural expediency of arbitration as one of the FAA’s
purposes with which the Discover Bank rule interferes, the dissent referred to the Court’s Dean Witter decision in
which it specifically “reject[s] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious
resolution of claims.” Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219
(1985)).
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Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was fueled by a singular distrust of class arbitration - a
distrust that also appeared in the Court’s 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corporation.42 In contrast, the AT&T Mobility dissent claimed that class
proceedings are necessary to protect against small-value claims falling through the cracks of the
legal system.43 Justice Scalia responded to the dissent’s concern by stating that “[s]tates cannot
require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated
reasons.”44 Thus, the Court went so far as to characterize class arbitration as not arbitration at all
within the meaning of the FAA, but a process that alters the fundamental attributes of arbitration.
Justice Thomas “reluctantly join[ed]” the majority, but wrote “separately to explain how
[he] would find [a] limit” on contract defenses permitted by FAA § 2.45 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Thomas reasoned that the savings clause of the FAA permits exceptions to the
enforceability of arbitration agreements only for defenses that “relate[] to the making of the
[arbitration] agreement.”46 Because the Discover Bank rule did not relate to the formation of the
arbitration agreement within the meaning of FAA §§ 2 and 4, Justice Thomas concluded that it
was preempted by the FAA. While Justice Thomas’ interpretation of FAA § 2 differed from prior
Supreme Court jurisprudence and was not briefed or advocated by the parties, his vote was
necessary for the 5-4 reversal.
In the AT&T Mobility dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor
and Kagan) argued that California’s Discover Bank rule “represents the ‘application of a more
general [unconscionability] principle.’”47 Because it is a rule of state law applicable to all
contracts and not just arbitration agreements, it falls within the savings clause and the FAA
should not preempt it.48 Additionally, the dissent criticized the plurality’s conclusion that class
arbitration is lacking the “fundamental attribute[s]” of arbitration within the meaning of the FAA.
Justice Breyer opined that barring class arbitration and forcing lower courts to enforce adhesive
class arbitration waivers would “have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims.”49

42

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 1753 (majority opinion).
45
Id. at 1753-54 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas felt compelled to articulate his reading of the savings
clause because, in past preemption cases, he dissented based on his view, first articulated in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-97 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting), that the FAA does not apply in state courts. Since
this case came up through the federal courts, that basis of dissent did not apply.
46
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1754-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2010)).
47
Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 564 (Cal. 2007)).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1761. Justice Breyer asked the Concepcion majority, “What rational lawyer would have signed on to
represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?” Id. (citing Carnegie
v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“…only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”)). In doing so,
he cited an appellate court which recognized previously the “realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million
individual suits, but zero individual suits,...” Id.
43
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Finally, the dissent expressed deep concern for the impact of the decision on principles of
federalism:
Through [the savings clause], Congress reiterated a basic federal idea
that has long informed the nature of this Nation’s laws. We have often
expressed this idea in opinions that set forth presumptions. Here,
recognition of that federalist ideal, embodied in specific language in
this particular statute, should lead us to uphold California’s law, not
strike it down. We do not honor federalist principles in their breach.50

Academic and media reaction to AT&T Mobility was swift and harsh.51 Much of the
criticism focused on the certain death of class arbitration as a method to redress small dollar value
claims through arbitration.52 Commentators agreed with the dissent that many consumers would
not be able to pursue their claims, and thus vindicate their statutory rights, if they could not
consolidate their claims with others into larger groups.53 Is AT&T Mobility such an unparalleled
disaster - a “tsunami,” as Professor Sternlight termed it?54

III.

AT&T M O B I L I T Y A N D FAA P R E E M P T I O N

In some ways, AT&T Mobility is logically consistent with the Court’s previous cases
imposing FAA preemption. As in most of the Court’s previous preemption cases (except
Mastrobuono),55 the Court’s decision resulted in the imposition of arbitration on an unwilling
disputant. This decision, like the previous ones, preempted a state law that did not involve
arbitration procedures. And, like in its previous preemption opinions, the Court elevated
principles of contractual autonomy over state law consumer protection regulations.

50

Id. at 1762 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Jean Sternlight, supra note 7; S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration ‘Change the Nature’ of
Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791928; Sarah Cole, Continuing the Discussion of the AT&T v. Concepcion Decision:
Implications for the Future, ADR Prof Blog, Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.indisputably.org/?p=2312 (“It would appear
that the era of class arbitration is over before it really ever began – unless Congress can be persuaded to amend the
FAA to permit class arbitration, at least in cases involving low value claims, where consumers are unlikely to have
practical recourse to a remedy through traditional bilateral arbitration.”); Marcia Coyle, Divided Justices Back
Mandatory Arbitration for Consumer Complaints, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Apr. 28, 2011, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202491963074&slreturn=1 (quoting lawyer for Concepcions as stating “’[t]he
decision will make it harder for people with civil rights, labor, consumer and other kinds of claims that stem from
corporate wrongdoing to join together to obtain their rightful compensation’”).
52
Sternlight, supra note 7, at 704 (“It is highly ironic but no less distressing that a case with a name meaning
“conception” should come to signify death for the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs.”); Sarah Cole, On Babies
and Bathwater, supra note 7, at 464 (“most pressing issue in consumer arbitration, in the wake of recent Supreme Court
decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for consumers with low value claims”).
53
See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: From Unconscionability to Vindication of Rights,
SCOTUSBLOG, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-fromunconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (“The AT&T ruling is the real game-changer for
class action litigation, as it permits most of the companies that touch consumers’ day-to-day lives to place themselves
beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by simply incorporating class waiver language into their standard-form
contracts.”).
54
See Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 7.
55
See Exhibit A.
51
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Indeed, the Court’s very first FAA preemption case, Southland v Keating,56 preempted a
California state law that, as interpreted by California’s high court, provided a ground for the
revocation of any contract - just as in AT&T Mobility. In Southland, several 7-Eleven franchisees
sued franchisor Southland in California state court alleging various common law claims, as well
as claims arising under the California Franchise Investment Law (CFIL).57 After the claims were
consolidated with other franchisees’ similar claims, Southland invoked the arbitration clause in
the franchise agreements and moved to compel arbitration of the action.58 Ultimately, the issue of
the arbitrability of the CFIL claims made its way to the California Supreme Court, which held
that they were not arbitrable in light of § 31512 of the statute – a provision that voided any
“condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind [a franchisee] to waive compliance with
any provision of [the CFIL].”59
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the FAA preempted §
31512 of the CFIL. Dismissing the dissent’s contention that the savings clause preserves this
defense to arbitration for the states, the Court concluded that § 31512 was not a ground for the
revocation of any contract (and thus not within the scope of the savings clause), but was a
“ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the
[CFIL].”60 The Court reached this conclusion even though § 31512 on its face did not mention
arbitration and presumably applied to many different kinds of agreements, not just arbitration
agreements. When considered through the lens of Southland’s preemption of a seemingly
contract-neutral state law, AT&T Mobility paves no new ground.
In some ways, however, this case appears to stretch the FAA preemption doctrine beyond
its previous scope, as it reflects the Court’s first preemption of a traditional common law defense
to the enforcement of any contract (here, unconscionability).61 The Court found latent antiarbitration animus in California’s unconscionability defense in the way that California courts
applied the Discover Bank doctrine to arbitration agreements.62 At the core of previous
preemption decisions was not a traditional common law defense to contracts that easily associated
with the savings clause.63 Those decisions involved the preemption of a state statute or rule that
was enacted to remove forum choice from contracting parties (Southland, Preston, Allied-Bruce
Terminix, and Perry) or was patently anti-arbitration (Cassarotto and Mastrobuono (and postAT&T Mobility, Marmet)).
Another striking difference from prior preemption cases is the AT&T Mobility Court’s
measures to strip arbitrators of a power – the power to conduct class arbitration proceedings
(unless all parties expressly agreed to them). In contrast, the Court’s previous preemption cases
endorsed arbitrators’ broad powers to fashion procedures and remedies to suit the parties’ needs
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and the dispute.64 Ironically enough, the end result in Southland, which arose out of a purported
class action of convenience store franchisee claims, was forcing unwilling franchisees into
arbitration, possibly using class action-type procedures.65 The end result in AT&T Mobility is
somewhat the inverse – forcing consumers who sought class arbitration into individual, small
claims arbitration.
Why didn’t the Southland Court balk at sending franchisees into class arbitration?
Possibly because the parties did not litigate the issue of the propriety of class arbitration in
1984.66 Or was class arbitration in 1984 closer to FAA arbitration than it is in 2011?
What was different in 1984 was that the FAA federalism see-saw still tipped towards the
states, and the Supreme Court had just begun its expansion of the preemptive force of the FAA.
In fact, as recently as 2009, before the Court’s “third arbitration trilogy,”67 the Court in Vaden
stated that “[g]iven the substantive supremacy of the FAA, but the Act's nonjurisdictional cast,
state courts have a prominent role to play as enforcers of agreements to arbitrate.”68 The third
arbitration trilogy, and, in particular, AT&T Mobility, strips the courts of one of the only doctrines
remaining to play that enforcer role, raising serious federalism concerns.69 Despite the Vaden
Court’s polite nod to the states acknowledging that they have a “prominent role to play,” state
courts have few weapons left to police the fairness of arbitration agreements.70

IV.

FAA P R E E M P T I O N P O S T -AT&T M O B I L I T Y

Where does AT&T Mobility leave the FAA preemption doctrine? States are now
struggling to regulate the fairness of arbitration agreements sought to be enforced within their
borders. It is now crystal-clear that states cannot enact substantive statutes either expressly or
implicitly hostile to arbitration. States also cannot circumvent the enforceability of arbitration
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See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1995) (preempting state law that
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employees and consumers”).
68
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multi-claim action are not arbitrable, court must compel arbitration of remaining claims).
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agreements through administrative regulations that prefer administrative forums over arbitration
for the resolution of disputes. And state courts cannot create common law rules that de facto are
hostile to arbitration, even if on their face they treat all agreements equally. The Supreme Court’s
FAA preemption decisions have reduced the savings clause to a largely symbolic nod to
federalism, toothless in its application. By over-preempting state law grounds for revocation of
any contract, the Court has ignored federalism concerns and tipped the carefully prescribed
balance of power away from the states, expanding the FAA even more than it had before.
How can courts invalidate unfair arbitration agreements under the current FAA overpreemption regime? Some decisions emanating from states’ high courts post-AT&T Mobility
reflect unyielding FAA preemption of state law with respect to the enforceability of arbitration
agreements containing class action waivers.71 Likewise, Professor Sternlight’s analysis of federal
court reaction in the six months after the case revealed that most decisions applied the AT&T
Mobility holding rigorously, despite ample grounds for distinction from AT&T Mobility.72
However, a few federal courts have been more willing to distinguish AT&T Mobility and
strike down a class action waiver under the "vindicating statutory rights" doctrine.73 Under this
doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Mitsubishi74 that “so long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,
the [federal] statute [providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function,” a disputant can argue that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable because
an unfair aspect of the arbitration process would preclude that party from vindicating its statutory
rights.75
For example, in In Re American Express Merchants’ Litigation,76 a purported class action
arising under federal antitrust laws, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered, in light of
AT&T Mobility, its prior decisions that a class action waiver clause in a credit card agreement was
unenforceable under the FAA77 because “enforcement of the clause would effectively preclude
any action seeking to vindicate the [plaintiffs’] statutory rights.”78 The Court of Appeals found
that AT&T Mobility did not alter its prior analysis, which rested on a different ground than AT&T
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Mobility.79 Rather, the Court of Appeals recognized, “[h]ere…our holding rests squarely on a
‘vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive law of
arbitrability.’”80 Because plaintiffs demonstrated through expert testimony that pursuing their
statutory claims individually, as opposed to through class arbitration, would not be economically
feasible, thereby “effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust
laws,”81 the Second Circuit directed the district court to deny defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration.82
Amex III does not equalize the federalism balance because it dealt with the federal law of
arbitrability, not the preemption of an arguably conflicting state law.83 However, states can
distinguish AT&T Mobility on numerous grounds to limit its federalism impact.84 Courts can
limit it to the class action waiver contract, yet still find other grounds for unconscionability of the
arbitration clause. Courts also can apply a contract-neutral state unconscionability doctrine to
void a class action waiver.85
Additionally, if a primary reason parties try to void arbitration agreements is to avoid a
process they perceive as unfair, then states can offer secondary protection to those parties in the
form of regulation of the process. The Supreme Court has not ruled that a section of the FAA
other than § 2 applies in state court or preempts conflicting state law, nor has it held that state
arbitration law is preempted to the extent it regulates arbitration procedures. In fact, the one time
the Court considered and rejected an FAA preemption argument involved a state procedural law
that governed the order of proceedings, not the viability of arbitration itself.86 Thus, states can
still enact procedural arbitration law that can have some impact on the integrity of the process,
and then to some extent, address the concerns of disputants seeking to avoid an arbitration
agreement.
State courts can also seize upon the "vindicating rights" federal law doctrine and carve
out an exception to arbitrability under state law if a party can show some aspect of the arbitration
contract or agreement precludes it from being able to vindicate its state statutory rights in
arbitration. Courts can still resuscitate the savings clause by applying relevant common law
79
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contract defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Unless Congress amends the
FAA to eliminate the savings clause altogether, the Supreme Court would be hard-pressed to find
that the FAA preempts common law defenses to the enforcement of any contract.

V.

CONCLUSION

There seems to be little doubt that AT&T Mobility will have an adverse impact on
consumer arbitration, as it effectively eliminates the states’ ability to preserve class arbitration as
a procedural method of aggregating low-value claims. In my view, the Court’s decision differs
from its prior preemption cases in both the type of rule preempted and its respect for arbitrators’
powers. These differences contribute to the resulting over-preemption of the FAA.
Yet, despite the Court's consistent message to the states that there is no room to
circumvent the FAA’s ironclad support of arbitration agreements, I remain hopeful that - even
post AT&T Mobility - lower state and federal courts will find ways to counter the seemingly overpreemptive, super-status of the FAA. The FAA preempts only state laws, not federal laws, thus,
federal unconscionability law may still invalidate a class arbitration waiver. In addition, other
federal statutes may trump the FAA, such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’s anti-waiver
provision, which may prevent the enforcement of a class arbitration waiver in the securities
context.87 Finally, like the Second Circuit did in Amex III, courts can give more teeth to the
“vindicating statutory rights” ground as the ultimate policer of the fairness of arbitration, and thus
rebalance the allocation of power between the states and federal government in the arbitration law
arena.

87

See Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 75 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116-18 (2012) (arguing that a class action waiver in the securities context could violate antiwaiver provisions of federal securities laws because it would weaken investors’ ability to recover under those laws).

36

Exhibit A
Case name
Southland Corp.
v. Keating

Year
Law at issue
1984 § 31512 of
California
Franchise
Investment Law
requiring judicial
resolution of claims

Preemption?
Yes, of California
Supreme Court’s ruling
on anti-arbitration state
statute

Perry v. Thomas

1987

Yes, of California
Supreme Court’s
refusal under anti-arb
state statute to compel
arbitration of securities
broker’s claim against
firm for commissions

Volt Information
Sciences v. Bd.
of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior
Univ.

1989

Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson

1995

Mastrobuono v.
Shearson
Lehman Hutton

1995

Doctor’s Assocs.
v. Cassarotto

1996

California Labor
Law § 229 allowing
wage collection
actions to be
resolved in court,
regardless of
arbitration
agreement
§ 1281 of
California
Arbitration Act
allowing stay of
arbitration pending
outcome of related
litigation with third
party
Alabama statute
invalidating predispute arbitration
agreements in
consumer contracts
New York judicial
rule precluding
arbitrators from
awarding punitive
damages
Montana statute
requiring specific
type of notice in
contract

37

Outcome
Convenience store
franchisees must
bring their CFIL
claims in
arbitration, possibly
using class
procedures
Kidder Peabody
could force its
broker into
arbitration

No; affirmed California
Court of Appeals’
denial of contractor’s
motion to compel
arbitration in favor of
University; arbitration
procedural rule

Enforced CAA in
construction
contract; stayed
arbitration; allowed
litigation to proceed
with third party

Yes, of Alabama
Supreme Court’s
refusal to compel
arbitration under antiarbitration state statute
Yes; reversed Seventh
Circuit vacatur of
punitive damages
award under antiarbitration state judicial
rule
Yes; reversed Montana
Supreme Court’s
refusal to enforce
PDAA in franchise
agreement under antiarb state statute

Homeowners had to
arbitrate claims
against termite
company
Permitted recovery
for investors from
completed
arbitration

Franchisees forced
into arbitration

Exhibit A - Continued
Case name
Buckeye
Check
Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna

Year
2006

Law at issue
Florida judicial rule
precluding arbitrators
from deciding legality
of contract containing
arbitration agreement

Preston v.
Ferrer

2008

California statute
allowing
administrative forum
for claims arising
under Talent Agencies
Act

AT&T
Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion

2011

Marmet
Health Care
Ctr. v. Brown

2012

California judicial
decision declaring
class arbitration
waivers
unconscionable in
most consumer
agreements
West Virginia
Supreme Court rule
voiding as against
public policy predispute arbitration
clauses in nursing
home contracts with
respect to negligence
claims
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Preemption?
Yes; reversed Florida
Supreme Court’s refusal
to permit arbitrators to
decide whether allegedly
usurious contract was
void ab initio for
illegality
Yes, reversed California
Court of Appeals’ grant
of stay of arbitration
pending proceedings
before Labor
Commissioner under
anti-arbitration state
statute
Yes, of California
Supreme Court’s antiarbitration judicial rule
interpreting state
unconscionability statute

Outcome
Borrowers forced
to arbitrate their
claim of usury

Yes, remanding back to
West Virginia Supreme
Court to decide
unconscionability of
contract apart from antiarbitration public policy
rule

Highest state
court forced to
reconsider its
own state law

Attorney allowed
to proceed with
fee claim against
Judge Alex in
arbitration

Consumer forced
to bring
arbitration claim
on an individual,
not class, basis

